Aristotle and Moral Realism

This volume investigates Aristotle’s ethics through the lens of moral realism, asking whether Aristotle provides resources for understanding morality as objective, rationally defensible, and truth-bearing. Robert Heinaman’s introduction frames the discussion around meta-ethical questions concerning moral truth, value, practical reason, ethical objectivity, and the relation between moral and scientific forms of knowledge. The essays then examine how Aristotle’s account of virtue, practical wisdom, justice, tragedy, human nature, and eudaimonia may support or complicate realist interpretations. Bernard Williams and Rosalind Hursthouse focus on virtuous action and the reasons of the virtuous agent; Pierre Aubenque and Troels Engberg-Pedersen analyze the natural foundation of justice; Jonathan Lear and Stephen Halliwell debate tragedy’s role in testing Aristotle’s ethical rationalism; Sabina Lovibond and Troels Engberg-Pedersen consider Aristotle in relation to modern and post-Hegelian ethics; David Charles and Stephen Everson address Aristotle’s connection to modern realism and evaluative explanation; John McDowell and David Wiggins discuss eudaimonism, ethical value, and realism. Together, the essays present Aristotle not merely as a historical figure in ancient ethics, but as a strategic interlocutor for contemporary debates on moral objectivity, practical rationality, and the philosophical foundations of virtue.