Morality and Moral Reasoning: Five Essays in Ethics

The volume begins by distinguishing two interconnected areas of inquiry. The first concerns the nature of moral judgment: whether moral utterances primarily express beliefs, feelings, attitudes, evaluations, or some combination of these. This question leads to sustained discussion of expression, sincerity, speech acts, and the relationship between a speaker’s moral language and underlying emotional or intellectual states. The essays argue that moral judgment is closely connected with the agent’s broader moral perspective rather than functioning merely as an impersonal classification of conduct. The second area concerns moral reasons and relevance. The contributors ask when a fact, circumstance, consequence, principle, social role, or personal relationship provides a legitimate basis for moral judgment. Particular attention is given to agency, responsibility, absolutist principles, and consequentialist evaluation. The concluding essay argues that commitment to honour, duty, character, or an unconditional principle is not inherently irrational merely because it resists calculation by consequences; disputes between such positions must ultimately be resolved through substantive moral argument rather than conceptual analysis alone.