Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons

The book is organized around nine substantive chapters. “Situating Reductionism” defines reductionism about persons as a middle position between non-reductionism and eliminativism, using Buddhist distinctions between conventional and ultimate truth to clarify its scope. “Refuting the Self” examines arguments against the view that personal continuity requires an enduring self, linking the belief in selfhood with existential suffering. “Getting Impersonal” responds to objections against reductionism and explains how a complete account of reality may avoid reference to persons while still preserving their conventional usefulness. “Wholes, Parts and Supervenience” develops a mereological analysis of composite entities and asks whether persons or other wholes possess stronger ontological status than conceptual constructions. “Ironic Engagement” studies the ethical consequences of Buddhist reductionism, especially the possibility of reduced egoistic concern and increased benevolence. “Establishing Emptiness” introduces the Mahāyāna challenge to reductionism through the critique of intrinsic essence. “Empty Knowledge” explores the epistemological consequences of emptiness, presenting a contextualist alternative to skepticism. “The Turn of the True” examines the semantic implications of emptiness and the status of conventional truth. “Empty Persons” returns to ethics, arguing that even if persons are empty, the case for altruism and benevolent engagement remains philosophically defensible.