Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory

The book systematically evaluates major philosophical challenges to naturalism, including the explanatory gap, cognitive closure, the knowledge argument, and arguments concerning inverted or absent qualia. Carruthers argues that many anti-physicalist objections rely on ambiguities regarding facts, properties, representation, and subjective perspective. He also analyses first-order representational theories, acknowledging their explanatory strengths while contending that they cannot adequately account for the distinction between conscious and non-conscious experience. The later chapters compare higher-order experience theory, actualist higher-order thought theory, dispositionalist higher-order thought theory, and Daniel Dennett’s account of consciousness. Particular attention is given to the role of intentional content, narrow content, consumer semantics, language, memory, temporal representation, and the alleged Cartesian theatre. The resulting theory presents phenomenal consciousness as a cognitively structured but scientifically intelligible phenomenon, positioned at the intersection of philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. The book comprises eleven chapters. Chapter 1 establishes its methodological framework through physicalism, naturalism, functionalism, theory-theory, and distinctions among different forms of consciousness. Chapter 2 examines perspectival, subjective, and “myness” facts, together with questions concerning properties, necessary identities, and logical supervenience. Chapter 3 addresses cognitive closure, the explanatory gap, the knowledge argument, and inverted or absent qualia. Chapter 4 considers the naturalisation of consciousness through intentional and narrow content. Chapters 5 and 6 introduce and critically evaluate first-order representationalism, focusing especially on evidence for non-conscious experience. Chapter 7 develops an initial defence of higher-order representationalism and discusses its implications for qualia, animals, infants, autism, and moral status. Chapters 8 and 9 formulate and defend dispositionalist higher-order thought theory, comparing it with higher-order experience theory and actualist higher-order thought theory while explaining subjective feel through consumer semantics. Chapter 10 investigates the relationship between phenomenal consciousness, higher-order representation, and language. Chapter 11 addresses fragmentary consciousness, temporal representation, multiple-drafts models, and objections involving the Cartesian theatre.