Tathāgatagarbha, Emptiness, and Monism

The article begins by situating tathāgatagarbha as a major Buddhist doctrine that raises fundamental questions about the nature of the Buddhist absolute, the meaning of emptiness, and the boundary between Buddhist thought and substantialist metaphysics. Hubbard first reviews interpretations by scholars such as Yamaguchi Susumu, Ogawa Ichijō, Takasaki Jikidō, Obermiller, Lamotte, Frauwallner, Ruegg, Nagao, Johnston, Hakamaya Noriaki, and Matsumoto Shirō. The discussion then defines different forms of monism, especially substantival monism and attributive monism, before turning to pratītyasamutpāda and śūnyatā as the doctrinal background for tathāgatagarbha. The central section analyzes the Ratnagotravibhāga, focusing on its identification of tathāgatagarbha with emptiness while also emphasizing affirmative predicates such as permanence, bliss, self, purity, and the existence of Buddha-qualities. The article concludes that tathāgatagarbha should be treated as a distinctive doctrinal development rather than merely a restatement of emptiness, and that its positive language creates important philosophical and ethical tensions within Buddhist thought.