The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta

The main content of The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta is organized as a comparative philosophical inquiry into the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. Mervyn Sprung’s introduction frames the issue as a central problem in Indian and Western philosophy: how thought, language, and experience can speak meaningfully about what is ultimately real without reducing it to ordinary conceptual categories. T. R. V. Murti’s essay compares saṃvṛti and paramārtha in Madhyamaka and Advaita Vedānta, emphasizing both structural similarities and decisive doctrinal differences. Frederick J. Streng examines the significance of pratītyasamutpāda for understanding the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth in Nāgārjuna. Sprung’s own essay treats the Madhyamaka doctrine of two realities as a metaphysical problem, while Bimal Krishna Matilal offers a critique of the Madhyamaka position, especially around emptiness, dependence, and ontological implication. Shotaro Iida analyzes saṃvṛti and paramārtha in Śāntarakṣita-Madhyamaka, A. K. Warder asks whether Nāgārjuna should be understood as a Mahāyānist, Herbert Guenther discusses the two truths in Yogācāra according to Tibetan sources, Richard W. Brooks studies Advaita Vedānta’s doctrine of māyā, and J. G. Arapura examines māyā in relation to discourse about Brahman. Together, the essays show that the two-truths problem is not merely a technical doctrinal distinction, but a strategic philosophical framework for negotiating appearance and reality, language and silence, conceptual analysis and liberating insight.