Ethics in Early Buddhism

The review begins by identifying Kalupahana’s central thesis: early Buddhist ethics, especially as found in the Pāli Suttas, should be understood through radical empiricism, non-absolutist metaphysics, and pragmatic moral reasoning. Harvey explains that Kalupahana rejects the idea of permanent entities or eternal moral laws, including any interpretation of Nibbāna as a changeless transcendent realm. The first part of the reviewed book addresses historical background and philosophical problems. It compares pre-Buddhist Indian moral theories, Brahmanical ideas, Jainism, Śramaṇa movements, knowledge, truth, fact-value relations, will, language, the individual, and society. Harvey notes that this part is more epistemological than directly ethical. The second part analyzes the moral life through concepts such as brahmacariya, virtues, the Noble Eightfold Path, freedom, the status of moral principles, karma, rebirth, and the justification of moral practice. Harvey highlights Kalupahana’s view that Buddhist morality is not grounded in absolute law but in pragmatic cultivation directed toward freedom and wellbeing. The third part applies Buddhist ethical principles to social relations, economics, politics, law, justice, and nature. Harvey notes that Kalupahana interprets early Buddhist ethics as a model of mutual self-interest aimed at the welfare, happiness, and freedom of oneself and others. The review concludes that the book offers valuable insights into Buddhist social ethics, but gives limited attention to concrete practices such as the five precepts and reflects a philosophical reading that remains debatable.